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LEVINAS AND THE VISIBILITY OF
GOD: A “SEEING” THAT DOES NOT
KNOW WHAT IT SEES
Corey Beals

C

an we see God or not? Is God visible or invisible? These questions
extend to several others, but first I should clarify what I mean,
since there are so many ways in which we can speak of visibility. One
could speak of visual perception—the way you might see a bird or a
firefly, or another person walking toward you down the path. But one
could also speak of vision in conceptual terms—the way I see the way
to solve a problem, or in the way I see that the angles of a triangle add
up to the sum of two right angles, or in the way that I say, “Do you see
what I mean?” In this second sense, vision amounts to understanding,
or knowledge. It is primarily in this second sense that I am asking
the question about the visibility of God, and this conceptual sense of
vision can even be taken to include, more generally, knowledge, and
speech about what we conceptually see. So the questions within the
question of God’s visibility include: “Can I know God? If so, can I
know God directly? If so, can I speak of God? If so, when and how
can God be known?”
I admit that this is a most difficult topic to think about, and that
my approach to it will not be to lay out a set of definitive, prescriptive
answers. Nor will I be pursuing a strictly scholarly analysis of the
question. Rather, I intend to talk about my wrestling with these
questions, and I will also tell about my advances and injuries so far.
This has been a struggle and a journey that I am happy to share
because I look forward to finding and connecting with others who
have struggled or are wrestling with similar questions.
The more I grapple with these questions, and the more I look to
the Quaker tradition for help with these questions, the more I am
convinced that I am not alone. In fact, I have found that this issue
has deep roots in Quaker soil and am convinced that how we address
the issue will affect the ways in which Friends live and prophesy in the
future.
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But rather than focusing on how to answer the questions I have
raised, I want to spend most of my time understanding the questions
and asking them well. Einstein has said that “If I had an hour to save
the world, I would spend the first 55 minutes defining the problem,
1
and five minutes finding the solution.”
I will show that we have strong reason and historical precedent for
answering both yes and no to the question of God’s visibility, and will
look for help from several others—George Fox, Emmanuel Levinas,
and Gregory Palamas, who was a Quaker before his time. All of these
have helped me greatly in framing the question and have even helped
as I have looked for ways to respond to the questions.

The Problematic Question
Though this question has been bubbling for years in me, it resurfaced
in an interesting way at the November 2007 QTDG meetings, where
we heard a lively set of papers about our Quaker understandings of
2
sacrament. It was clear from the discussion that this is a controversial
and important question needing further attention. As I was
moderating—or clerking, rather—it seemed to me that the question
that evening on which all of the discussion about sacraments seemed
to turn was the question of whether or not divine experience could
be experienced directly and in unmediated ways, or whether it was
somehow always mediated? So, that is one question I hope to pick
up and work on further. This present discussion, then, can be seen
as a continuation of that crucial question of sacraments that has
implications for how we understand and experience the presence of
God in our midst. Can God be seen? Can God be experienced, and if
so, then how?
Drawing from the Quaker past, this interest has also been a point of
central importance. There are of course many ways that Quakers have
been distinctively prophetic in Western Christianity and culture, but
it just may be that the most vital of those prophetic contributions has
been the possibility and the centrality of experience with the divine.
The tension between mediated and unmediated experience is present
throughout the tradition, however, since even as the testimonies of
direct experience of the divine abound, cautious clarification is often
given acknowledging the limitations of our divine knowledge.
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The tensions are not just between different Quakers, but are
present even within the thought of leading Quakers. For example,
we see George Fox embracing both the visibility and invisibility of
God, saying “All things are seen, visible and invisible, by the divine
light of Christ” (Journal, p. 29). Not only is this showing a sort of
illumination theory of knowledge, whereby all things that are known
are known by the light of Christ, but he is suggesting that by this light,
we see even that which is invisible. How is it, then, that we “see the
invisible?” Was Fox just confused, or was he speaking prophetically?
Even while he has high claims for our ability to see this divine light,
and to see all other things by this light, Fox nonetheless admits that
there is that about God which remains invisible. He writes that “God
hath opened to me by his invisible power how that every [person] was
enlightened by the divine light of Christ; and I saw it shine through
all.” [Journal, p. 33]. Thus, even as he describes the ubiquitous light
of Christ that shines through everyone, he also acknowledges the fact
that God’s power is invisible. This is a deep tension that he speaks of
very matter-of-factly—God’s power is invisible, yet he experiences it
directly. This tension is so thick as to make a philosopher nervous and
raise suspicion of contradiction. But I want to explore whether this
tension expressed by Fox, and many others who also gave testimony
to direct experience of an invisible God, were merely confused and
conflicted or speaking truthfully of their experience. I will turn
now to another expression of this tension—found in the writings of
Emmanuel Levinas.

Levinas

and the

Visibility

of

God

What then does Levinas write about the invisibility and visibility of
God? Using the conceptual sense of the word vision, one can imagine
why Levinas would insist on the invisibility of God. For Levinas, one
encounters infinity in the face of the Other—a particular human. So
reducing the infinite to a finite category is not only impossible, but
the attempt to do so is harmful. In this sense, the Other—and the
infinite encountered in the Other—is irreducible to a concept and is
therefore invisible. So it is easy to see why the infinite in its infinity is
inconceivable and likewise invisible.
I concede and embrace the invisibility of the divine. The difficulty
is asking whether God is ever visible, and if so, how that is possible
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in conjunction with God’s invisibility. I was helped in seeing how
Levinas framed this tension. In the opening pages of his first major
work, Totality and Infinity, he states that the infinite is invisible.
This seems to be a clear denial of the visibility and presence of the
infinite. But in the very next sentence he says that this “invisibility
3
does not denote an absence of relation; it implies relations.” So is he
contradicting himself? If not, then what does he mean? Elsewhere,
in God, Death and Time, he writes that transcendence does not come
4
down to the fulfillment of an aiming by a vision. He rejects that
transcendence is something that we see in this intentional way. He
says quite clearly that “the idea of fulfilling an aiming or intending by
5
a vision is out of the question.” But later, on the same page, he writes
of the infinity directly encountered in the face of the Other. He says,
“It is impossible to elude the other [person] in his exigency, in his
6
face, which is extreme immediate exposure, total nudity.”
Later he expresses this paradoxical visibility and invisibility in
even sharper distinction saying that in the face of the Other we find a
“transcendence…without vision, a ‘seeing’ that does not know what it
7
sees.” Let me emphasize that again—in the face of the Other we find
a “transcendence… without vision, a ‘seeing’ that does not know what
it sees.” How is this possible? Is he again confused and contradictory
within one sentence? Or is it possible that he is speaking of two types
of vision? Perhaps one vision is a vision that encompasses the subject
with complete thought, while the other is a raw, direct, though
incomplete, encountering?
There are other equally perplexing formulations of what must
either be a contradiction or a paradox. He says that the “in” of infinite can be taken in two ways—that which is not finite, or that which
is within the finite. So Levinas is saying that that which is not finite—
the infinite—is present within the finite.
Two more examples of real or apparent contradictions are
8
“wakefulness without intentionality” and “attention without
9
exposition.” Both references speak of the possibility of being
attentively aware of the infinite even though it is something one
neither could have expected nor have explained. But the fact that one
cannot expect it or explain it does not remove it from the possibility
of awareness.
Though this is perhaps surprising coming from a postmodern
philosopher, Levinas appears to be saying that direct—immediate—
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awareness of the infinite is possible, even though it is unpredictable
and non-explicable and uncontainable. He sees the invisible infinity
directly in the visible and finite face of the Other. This is where Levinas
shows himself to be a true Quaker, I think (despite his being Jewish),
since he sees that of God in everyone.

To Speak

or to

Remain Silent?

By this point in the discussion, perhaps I have done nothing but
show that Quakers and Levinas have encountered this paradox of the
visibility and invisibility of God, and they have tried in various ways
to express this paradox. One might wonder why a philosopher should
attempt to say anything about such a matter to begin with. If it is
a mystery, then it seems that speaking philosophically about such a
matter can only kill the mystery. The last thing I want to do is to kill
10
this mystery, so why do anything other than pass it over in silence?
I will be honest that the reason I am looking at this is because
this is an issue I am trying to work out for myself. I am trying to
wrestle through competing intuitions and testimonies that I have
encountered. On the one hand is the testimony of others and my own
experience that suggests to me the possibility of direct communion
with the divine. On the other hand is my acknowledgement of
the impossibility of finding words or conceptions that capture this
experience, along with the awareness of the harm that can and has
been done by those claiming intimate knowledge of the divine. One
testimony or intuition is likely to negate the other, yet I want to find
a way to preserve them both. Why not just declare paradox and leave
it alone? Why be any more specific than that?
For some, that may be all that is needed, but I find that I need
more help than that in preserving the mystery. I want to help protect
my experiences and these deep intuitions from the voices (internal
and otherwise) that deny the possibility of encountering the divine on
account of the impossibility of conceiving of God. Yet, I also am aware
of the dangers that come with affirming the possibility of encountering
the divine—the dangers of destroying that mystery by domesticating
or misusing it—and I want to guard myself against those as well. I am
listening and speaking about this not to let words solve the problem,
but to help preserve the mystery in which I can eventually rest in
silence.
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In my quest to preserve this paradoxical mystery, I have found
much aid recently from Gregory Palamas, a 14th century Orthodox
writer. In the 11th and 13th centuries, Eastern and Western Christians
were debating this central issue of the direct knowability of God. In
the West—Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and his view of the distant
God won out over Bernard of Clairvoux’s (1091-1153) view of an
intimate God, and thus began scholasticism. But in the East, Symeon
the New Theologian (949-1022) and his view of an intimate God
won out over Stephen of Nicomedia and his picture of a distant
11
God. The West sided with the impossibility of directly encountering
God, while in the East the same debate went a different direction.
The Reformation, with some notable exceptions, did not reform on
this central issue, and the God of the West was viewed as one that
could only be experienced in a mediated way. This is probably why
Fox and the Quakers did not find that the Western Church spoke to
their condition. One is not surprised, then, to find a deep connection
between the Friends and the Orthodox (though on the issue of form,
there are some obvious differences). So, what was taking place on the
other side of the world?

Gregory Palamas (1296-1359)—Beyond Knowing
and Unknowing
Gregory Palamas affirmed the transcendence of God by using the
via negativa—negative theology—to say what God was not. And he
used the apophatic approach to say, with others, that “Thou art God
12
ineffable, invisible, incomprehensible.” Yet, at the same time, he
defended the possibility of seeing the light of God directly. Bringing
this paradox to a fine point, he writes, “For God is not only beyond
13
knowledge, but also beyond unknowing.”
Gregory also provided a distinction—a way of understanding the
question—that I have found tremendously helpful in preserving this
paradox of God’s invisibility and visibility. The distinction he makes is
between divine essence and divine energies. Gregory writes that God’s
essence—God’s nature—is absolutely invisible to us. But there is that
of God—God’s energies—which comes directly from God and is
14
uncreated. It is this (God’s energies) that we may see. The analogy
he uses is that of seeing light from the sun, which, while not being
the sun itself, is still in some way a direct contact with the sun. Or
consider the way we look at a fire and see flames and feel heat; still
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we do not encounter the “essence” of fire. The “energies” would
be analogous to the light and heat being emitted from the fire, but
the “essence” of the fire would be inaccessible to us. He writes that
“The rays [of God’s energies] are consequently visible… although the
15
divine essence is absolutely invisible.”
This distinction is one that has helped many in this tradition speak
of and practice direct encounter with the divine without falling into
pantheism. This distinction also protects one from claiming to be
God. Just as the bush that Moses observed was burning without being
consumed, so he describes how one might see or encounter God
without becoming the fire itself. Even though the bush is dwelling
in the fire, it does not take on the nature of fire. So we may speak of
direct dwelling in God without becoming God.
He speaks a little more explicitly about this distinction saying
that “this spiritual light is thus not only the object of vision, but it
is also the power by which we see; it is neither a sensation nor an
intellection, but is a spiritual power, distinct from all created cognitive
16
faculties.” But this still retains greater ambiguity than would please
most philosophers. Nonetheless, this is the greatest degree of clarity
at this point that I can muster. I am writing about this without having
figured it out, and I write in attempt not to figure this out completely
because I am not sure that is possible. Philosophy certainly can and
certainly has in some cases, played the role of demystifying and
demythologizing, and I want to avoid that trap. Instead, I am trying
to think as clearly as appropriate in order to protect that mystery. I
am doing this as part of my own journey, but invite others to join me
in helping speak of boundaries that might protect the space where
mystery is allowed to live and breathe freely.

Living From This Question
In our treatment of the question of the visibility or invisibility, my
respected colleague, Jeff Dudiak, took on the additional task of
explaining Levinas to those unfamiliar with his philosophy, and though
there is a wide variety of interpretations of Levinas (made possible by
the difficulty in comprehending the writing of Levinas), I will say that
I think he has presented Levinas very accurately. I also agree with him
in explaining why God might be inclined to “disappear”. As Dudiak
says so well in the companion essay, God is that which turns me to the
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other, and turns the other to me. But God remains invisible in order
to get out of the way of me loving my neighbor. One can easily see
and even experience what it is like to seek that of God in my neighbor,
but to miss truly seeing my neighbor because I’m only looking for the
divine residing therein.
I agree that there are significant ways in which God’s essence is
utterly invisible to us. I am inclined to think, though, that these can
all be true without eliminating the possibility of directly encountering
God’s energies. These are not the terms that Levinas uses, but it seems
entirely compatible with the paradox of which he speaks.
For me, at least, this way of framing the question helps me keep
either side of this paradox from collapsing and overwhelming the
other side. So now I find myself with this refined question: Instead
of asking whether God is visible or invisible, I now ask, “In what
ways is God invisible and in what ways is God visible?” Or, “How is
it impossible for us to know God immediately; how is it possible for
us to encounter God directly?” This does not solve the mystery, but
helps me live inside the mystery of encountering and loving God and
neighbor. The mystery just seems to get more magnificent rather than
becoming smaller.
Asking such a question has implications for how we view the
sacraments, and all of the discussion revolving around those topics in
an earlier issue. If one begins looking for ways in which God’s energies
are directly encountered in all of God’s creation, then that implies that
there is a way in which the divine is encountered directly in all of one’s
interactions with God’s creation. It opens up an intimidating range
of ways in which I might encounter God. If this is true of sparrows,
and lilies, rocks and trees, then how much more so is it true of my
interactions with my neighbor? If there is “that of God” in everyone,
and it is possible for me to engage that reality directly, what glorious
weight does it bring to every interaction with my neighbor?
Each portion of the question acts as a sort of balance to the other
portion of the question. Once I become aware that God is directly
present in all things, quickly the danger of pantheism arises, as does
the concern that I may give divine weight to what is really only a
distorted view of God’s goodness. So the part of the question that
asks how God remains invisible is a profound reminder that there
are many ways in which I can idolize the very creation that God
indwells. Asking the question in this way opens up the possibilities for
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encountering the indwelling divine presence. But it also opens up the
possibilities for idolatry.
Quakers have obviously been aware of the possibility of idolatry
when it comes to sacraments, and have played a prophetic role in this
regard. But perhaps it is time for us to extend our prophetic reach.
Not only are external religious forms open to idolatry, but internal
religious ideas are also open to becoming idolatrous. Why are inward
pictures of God any less vulnerable to idolatry than external pictures
of God? Perhaps the inward pictures are even more vulnerable to
idolatry, since I may be more likely to think that my inward picture
of God as God’s essence, which is utterly unknowable. By asking how
God’s essence is invisible, I perhaps open up new areas of my life for
examination. I must now look not only at outward forms to see if I
am idolizing them, but now I must also examine my internal forms.
It is not being external that makes them idols, or being internal that
makes them real. It is whether or not I presume to have captured
God’s essence in anything.
This way of asking the question has exponentially increasing
ramifications. It opens me up to new awareness of idolatry, and it
also opens me up to new awareness of divine presence. Approaching
the issue of visibility and invisibility in this way is dangerous, and it
means that there are more ways of being idolatrous than I formerly
thought possible. But it also means that there are more ways of
encountering the divine than I thought possible. This means that my
ways of interacting with my neighbors and God are not under my
control to the degree that may be comfortable. This is terrifying! And
in some ways, it seems terrible. But in fact, the more I walk into the
implications of this all-pervasive question, the more I realize that this
is terribly good.
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